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1. Introduction: Initial Difficulties with Rigidity and Natural Kind Terms 
 
A paradigmatic case of rigidity for singular terms is that of proper names. And it would 
seem that a paradigmatic case of rigidity for general terms is that of natural kind terms. 
However, many philosophers think that rigidity cannot be extended from singular terms to 
general terms. The reason for this is that rigidity appears to become trivial when such terms 
are considered: natural kind terms come out as rigid, but so do all other general terms, and in 
particular all descriptive general terms. This paper offers an account of rigidity for natural 
kind terms which does not trivialise in this way. On this account, natural kind terms are de 
jure obstinately rigid designators and other general terms, such as descriptive general terms, 
are not. 
 
A characterisation of rigidity was first offered by Kripke (1971: 144-146), who distinguishes 
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 What I call here ‘Kripke Rigidity’, Salmon calls ‘persistent rigidity’ (See 2005: 34). Note here the difference 
between Kripke’s first characterisation of rigidity in his 1971: 146, i.e. my (Kripke Rigidity), and that which he 
gives in Naming and Necessity: ‘[A] designator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object 
wherever [in every possible world in which] the object exists’ (1980: 49). Unlike the first one, this second 
characterisation is neutral on whether a rigid designator still designates the same object with respect to possible 
worlds in which that object does not exist. That is to say, it is neutral on whether rigid designators are 
persistently/Kripke rigid or obstinately rigid. Obstinate rigidity will be introduced in section 2. It should be 
stressed that Kripke distanced himself from the characterisation given in his 1971, which is the view of rigidity 
usually attributed to him, in favour of the more neutral one he put forward in his 1980. See Kaplan 1989b, n. 8 
and n. 8 for further discussion. 
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(Kripke Rigidity) A rigid designator is a designator that designates the same object 
in every possible world in which that object exists and does not designate anything 
in possible worlds in which that object does not exist. 
 
(Kripke Nonrigidity) A nonrigid designator is a designator that is not rigid, i.e. a 
designator that either designates some object in some but not all of the possible 
worlds in which that object exists or designates different objects in different 
possible worlds. 
 
There are clear examples of this distinction provided by proper names, such as ‘Aristotle’, 
which satisfy (Kripke Rigidity) and definite descriptions, such as ‘the pupil of Plato and 
teacher of Alexander the Great’, which satisfy (Kripke Nonrigidity). Of course, there are 
also many descriptions that satisfy (Kripke Rigidity), such as rigidified or actualised 
descriptions (e.g. ‘the actual pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great’) and 
descriptions that designate necessary existents (e.g. ‘the smallest prime’). This latter sort of 
descriptions belongs to a class of expressions which Kripke calls ‘strongly rigid designators’ 
(1980: 48-49): a strongly rigid designator satisfies (Kripke Rigidity) and it designates the 
same object (e.g. the number two) in every possible because there is no possible world in 
which that object does not exist – that object is a necessary existent. 
 
Proper names and definite descriptions are singular terms, and one question that has received 
a lot of attention recently is whether rigidity can be extended to general terms. More 
precisely the question is whether there are examples of the distinction between (Kripke 
Rigidity) and (Kripke Nonrigidity) that are provided respectively by natural kind terms (e.g. 
‘water’, ‘tiger’) and descriptive general terms (e.g. ‘transparent liquid of which lakes are 
composed, and which falls as rain’ or ‘yellow quadrupedal feline with blackish stripes’). It is 
natural to expect that while natural kind terms would satisfy (Kripke Rigidity), many 
descriptive general terms would not, just as while proper names satisfy it, many definite 
descriptions do not.
2
 It is a natural expectation to have because natural kind terms seem to be 
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 See inter alia Kripke 1980, Donnellan 1983, Schwartz 2002, Soames 2002, Salmon 2003, 2005, and Martì 
2004 for discussions of rigidity for natural kind terms. I leave aside the issue of how terms for artefacts (e.g. 
‘clock’) or cultural properties (e.g. ‘bachelor’) should be understood: whether they should be assimilated to 
natural kind terms or to descriptive general terms. 
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semantically on a par with proper names, and descriptive general terms seem to be 
semantically on a par with definite descriptions. For instance, many philosophers think that, 
like proper names, natural kind terms are both directly referential and nondescriptive and 
that, like definite descriptions, descriptive general terms are neither. The problem however is 
that (Kripke Rigidity) seems to become trivial when general terms are considered. 
 
Before seeing why, some preliminary remarks about extending (Kripke Rigidity) to natural 
kind terms are needed.  
 
Firstly, natural kind terms are general terms, and some might think that for this reason they 
should not be treated as referring expressions. Here, I will treat them as such, which is 
required if they are at all going to be rigid designators: only referring expressions are 
designators. However, I will briefly consider an alternative proposal below.  
 
Secondly, I will focus on natural kind terms (e.g. ‘tiger’) rather than on natural kind 
predicates (e.g. ‘is a tiger’), as some do (for instance Soames, 2002). Natural kind terms and 
predicates are closely related: to every natural kind term there corresponds a natural kind 
predicate. However, it is more natural to take natural kind terms to be the bearers of 
fundamental semantic properties such as rigidity or direct reference (on which I will say 
more later) rather than predicates, which are more complex expressions. I take natural kind 
terms (or natural kind nouns) to be syntactically and semantically simple expressions whose 
function is to refer to natural kinds: ‘water’ is a natural kind term; but descriptions such as 
‘transparent liquid of which lakes are composed, and which falls as rain’ and ‘H2O’ are not 
natural kind terms; they are both syntactically and semantically complex.  
 
Thirdly, for simplicity, I will apply (Kripke Rigidity) to both singular and general terms. 
This could be objected to on the grounds that (Kripke Rigidity) specifies a relation between a 
designator and the object which it refers to, and it is not obvious that general terms refer to 
objects. This is indeed not obvious: the fact that an expression refers does not entail that it 
refers to an object. Intuitively, natural kind terms refer to natural kinds: these may be objects 
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on some construals of natural kinds (e.g. as intensions) but not on others (e.g. as universals).
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Nothing in what follows turns on whether natural kinds are objects, and so bearing in mind 
that it might not be a final characterisation when it comes to general terms, I will apply 
(Kripke Rigidity), as well as other semantic notions defined below, across the board. 
 
Although nothing turns on whether the possible candidates to be the referents of natural kind 
terms are objects, finding a nontrivial application of (Kripke Rigidity) to natural kind terms 
puts some requirements on the sorts of properties these referents should have. In particular, 
applying (Kripke Rigidity) to natural kind terms requires finding stable referents across 
possible worlds to be the referents of these terms. Here is why. Consider first the simple 
proposal to construe the natural kinds which natural kind terms refer to as their extensions. 
On this proposal, natural kind terms will not be rigid because their extensions can be 
different in different possible worlds. For example the extension of the term ‘tiger’ is 
different in different possible worlds because the number of tigers is different in different 
possible worlds. However, intuitively, ‘tiger’ refers to the same natural kind in different 
possible worlds: if there was one tiger less than there actually are, ‘tiger’ would still refer to 
the same natural kind. So extensions are not suitable candidates to be the referents of natural 
kind terms. For an expression to be a rigid designator, its referent needs to stay the same in 
every possible world in which that referent intuitively exists. 
 
So now consider the proposal that natural kind terms refer to stable entities that do not vary 
from world to world (sui generis natural kinds or properties or intensions or universals or 
what have you). If we follow this proposal, we are now faced with the problem of 
trivialisation, which I mentioned at the beginning. Natural kind terms will indeed come out 
as rigid, for instance ‘water’ will refer to the same kind in every possible world in which that 
kind exists. But equally virtually all general terms will come out as rigid, and in particular all 
descriptive general terms will come out as rigid. The reason for this is that it is just as 
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 Some natural kind terms are mass nouns (e.g. ‘water’) and some are count nouns (e.g. ‘tiger’). It is a debated 
question how different syntactically and semantically the two sorts of terms really are (see Koslicki 1999 for 
discussion). For instance, on some accounts ‘water’ is a singular term that refers to an object, on others it is a 
general term that does not refer to an object. I shall treat both mass noun and count nouns as general terms. 
Nothing substantive he hangs on doing so here; for if mass nouns are singular terms, the conception of rigidity 
for natural kind terms and proper names developed in this paper still apply to them. 
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appropriate to take general descriptive terms to refer to stable referents as it is to take natural 
kind terms to refer to stable referents. For instance, ‘transparent liquid of which lakes are 
composed and which falls as rain’ will be rigid: it will designate the same property (say) in 
every possible world in which that property exists, namely that of being a transparent liquid 




So rigidity either does not apply (if referents are not stable) or trivialises (if referents are 
stable) when general terms are considered.  
 
Some have argued that these problems could be avoided by not taking natural kind terms to 
be referring expressions, a possibility which I have alluded to above. Rather, they are 
expressions whose function is simply to apply to objects or be true of samples in their 
extensions, and not to refer to natural kinds. For instance Devitt and Sterelny have proposed 
the following characterisation of what they call ‘rigid application’ which is supposed to hold 
of all and only natural kind terms (see Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 85, see also Devitt 2005):  
 
(Rigid Application) A general term F is a rigid applier iff, if F applies to an object 
in the actual world, and that object exists in another possible world, then F applies 
to that object in that world. 
 
(Rigid Application) entails that a rigid applier F, if it applies to an object in the actual world, 
applies to that object in every possible world in which that object exists; that is to say, that 
object is necessarily F. Intuitively given some plausible externalist semantic assumptions, 
‘water’ is a rigid applier because if it applies to samples of water (H2O) in the actual world, 
it applies to samples of water in all possible worlds; however ‘transparent liquid of which 
lakes are composed and which falls as rain’ is not: it may apply to samples of water in the 
actual world and to some other kind in another possible world. 
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 Several attempts have been made (e.g. Martì 2004 and LaPorte 2006) to try to create an asymmetry between 
natural kind terms and descriptive general terms by distinguishing between different properties that the latter 
might refer to (or express), some rigidly, others nonrigidly. I do not review these proposals here. 
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However, this account of rigidity is inadequate. First, (Rigid Application) is not inclusive 
enough: it leaves out many natural kind terms such as phase sortals (e.g. ‘tadpole’ or 
‘caterpillar’), which do not come out as rigid. For instance, ‘caterpillar’ is not a rigid applier 
because something that is a caterpillar in the actual world could be a butterfly in some other 
possible world; that thing is not necessarily a caterpillar.
5
 Secondly, (Rigid Application) is 
too inclusive: it counts as rigid appliers expressions that are not natural kind terms. For 
instance it counts noun-phrases such as ‘tiger or lemon’ as rigid appliers: if ‘tiger or lemon’ 
applies to an object in the actual world and that object exists in another possible world, then 
‘tiger or lemon’ applies to that object in that world. Intuitively these are not the sorts of 
expressions that we should count amongst natural kind terms. So (Rigid Application) is not 
the correct account of rigidity for natural kind terms. 
 
Because of these difficulties in applying it to general terms, some have concluded that 
(Kripke Rigidity), and indeed any notion of rigidity, is of no use when it comes to general 
terms. For instance Stephen Schwartz has claimed that because natural kind terms and 
descriptive general terms all come out as (Kripke Rigid), ‘[r]igidity has lost its exclusivity, 
like a club of which all are automatically members, and thereby its interest’ (Schwartz, 2002: 
266, see also Soames, 2002: ch. 9.) I think that this conclusion is incorrect. In the next 
sections, I will develop an account of rigidity that is ‘exclusive’ and that does not trivialise 
when general terms are considered. 
 
To do so, I will first briefly outline Kaplan’s semantic and metasemantic framework of direct 
reference for proper names. I will then argue that this framework can be used to develop a 
notion of rigidity that carves at the semantic joints: it applies to proper names and natural 
kind terms, and not to definite descriptions and descriptive general terms. 
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 It could be denied that phase sortals are natural kind terms (Devitt 2005); but this seems ad hoc. It could also 
be claimed that rather than applying to (enduring) objects, natural kind terms apply to temporal parts: in such a 
case ‘caterpillar’ would apply rigidly to all and only the temporal parts that are in its extension; any such 
temporal part would necessarily be a caterpillar. I do not discuss this option further, which seems to be an 
overreaction to the problem of applying rigidity to natural kind terms. 
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2. Obstinacy and the Framework of Direct Reference  
 
Many philosophers think that proper names and natural kind terms are directly referential 
expressions, and that definite descriptions and descriptive general terms are not. A directly 
referential expression is an expression whose reference is unmediated, i.e. not made via the 
mediation of any sort of descriptive content. As Kaplan puts it: 
 
The directly referential term goes directly to its referent, directly, in the sense that 
it does not first pass through the proposition. Whatever rules, procedures, or 
mechanisms there are that govern the search for the referent, they are irrelevant to 
the propositional component, to content. When the individual is determined, [it] is 
loaded into the proposition.
6
 (1989b: 569) 
 
Direct and nondirect reference can be defined as follows: 
 
(Direct Reference) A directly referential term is a term that only contributes its 
referent to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which it occurs. 
 
(Nondirect Reference) A nondirectly referential term is a term that refers but does 
not only contribute its referent to the propositions expressed by the sentences in 
which it occurs. 
 
For Kaplan, there are in natural language two paradigmatic sorts of directly referential 
expressions: indexicals and proper names. Both types of expressions only contribute their 
referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur; and for both, 
the ‘rules, procedures, or mechanisms there are that govern the search for the referent’ are 
not part of the propositional content. These rules are for indexicals their semantic characters, 
which determine their referents in different contexts of use. For instance the semantic 
character of the indexical ‘I’ is roughly that ‘I’ always refers to the agent of the context – 
where the agent can be different in different contexts. Proper names do not have semantic 
characters: once fixed, their referents remain the same in all contexts of use. The rules or 
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 Kaplan is working with a Russellian construal of propositions; other construals of propositions would be 
possible as long as there is a clear sense in which objects can be components of these propositions. 
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mechanisms that govern the search for the referent belong to the metasemantic facts that are 
relevant to assigning it a referent in the first place. For instance, once its referent is fixed, the 
proper name ‘Alice’ refers to Alice in all contexts of use. (See Kaplan, 1989b: 573 ff.).  
 
I will assume that the construal of direct reference which is relevant to natural kind terms is 
that for proper names: like proper names, natural kind terms do not have semantic characters 
– their referents are not different in different contexts of use. So although much of what 
follows would also be true of indexicals, I will confine the scope of my argument to proper 
names and natural kind terms. 
 
For Kaplan, the metasemantics of direct reference for proper names – that is, the explanation 
of how they get to be directly referential – involves the notion of dubbing. Proper names 
have the semantic property of direct reference because they are introduced at dubbings. 
Dubbing can be defined as follows (see Kaplan, 1990: 93ff.): 
 
(Dubbing) A dubbing is the semantic individuation of an expression by assigning it 
a referent. 
 
Kaplan talks of dubbings as creating words. For instance, the generic name ‘Alice’ pre-
semantically (before it has been used in a particular dubbing) has no meaning whatsoever; if 





In section 4, I will address the questions of what exactly counts as a dubbing and how 
dubbing might apply to both proper names and natural kind terms. For now, suffices to say 
that when it comes to proper names the semantic property of direct reference is entailed by 
the metasemantic one of being introduced at a dubbing: if a dubbing is the complete 
semantic individuation of a proper name by assigning it a referent, then all that a name 
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 See Kaplan 1989a: 560-1, 1973: 500 ff., and 1990, where he argues that the relation between generic and 
common currency names is not that between type and token: type and token are type and token of the same 
expression syntactically or syntactico-semantically individuated; but the relation between generic and common 
currency names is merely orthographic. We do not have to choose here between these ways of understanding 
this relation, which can both make sense of the idea that proper names are directly referential. 
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contributes to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which it occurs is the referent 
that individuates it. 
 
Consider rigidity again. At first, Kaplan took direct reference to be just a way of cashing out 
(Kripke Rigidity): he thought that the latter was underpinned by the former. However, they 
come apart. Firstly, not every expression which satisfies (Kripke Rigidity) is directly 
referential. For instance rigidified descriptions are not directly referential. Secondly, 
although every directly referential expression is a rigid designator, it is a different sort of 
rigid designator than that specified in (Kripke Rigidity). It is an obstinately rigid designator. 
Kaplan defines obstinately rigid and nonobstinately rigid designators as follows (see Kaplan, 
1989b: 568 ff., and also Salmon, 2005: 33-4): 
 
(Obstinacy) An obstinately rigid designator is a designator that designates the 
same object in all possible worlds regardless of whether it exists at a given world. 
 
(Nonobstinacy) A nonobstinately rigid designator is a rigid designator that is not 
obstinate, i.e. that does not refer to the same object in all possible worlds 
regardless of whether it exists at a given world. 
 
It is easy to see that (Obstinacy) is a semantic consequence of (Direct Reference): if a 
directly referential term only contributes its referent to the propositions expressed by the 
sentences in which it occurs, then, whenever we evaluate these propositions at a world, the 
referent is already part of the propositions evaluated. So at that world, there automatically is 
a referent for the term. As Kaplan puts it: 
 
If the individual is loaded into the proposition (to serve as the propositional 
component) before the proposition begins its round-the-worlds journey, it is hardly 
surprising that the proposition manages to find that same individual at all of its 
stops, even those in which the individual had no prior, native presence. The 
proposition conducted no search for a native who meets propositional 




Thus (Direct Reference) does not entail (Kripke Rigidity). With (Direct Reference), it is 
guaranteed in advance of evaluation that a directly referential term has a referent in all 
possible worlds, something which (Kripke Rigidity) does not guarantee. Consider the 
sentence ‘Aristotle is a philosopher’. If ‘Aristotle’ is directly referential, Aristotle is part of 
the proposition expressed by that sentence; if so, unlike with (Kripke Rigidity), when we 
evaluate that sentence at worlds, we do not look for Aristotle in these worlds, and then, if he 
exists there, say that ‘Aristotle’ refers to that person in that world and if he does not exist 
there, say that ‘Aristotle’ does not refer to anything. With (Obstinacy), if we evaluate 
‘Aristotle is a philosopher’ at a world in which Aristotle does not exist, ‘Aristotle’ still refers 
to (the actual) Aristotle. However the sentence is not true because it is not true that Aristotle 




Also, (Direct Reference) does not hold of definite descriptions, which contribute something 
descriptive to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur: the 
individuals they refer to are not part of these propositions and at every world at which we 
evaluate such propositions we have to search for an object that satisfies the description.  
 
Where does this leave us with the issue of definite descriptions and rigidity? Now, although 
definite descriptions are not directly referential, many such descriptions are obstinately rigid. 
Of course, some descriptions do not satisfy (Obstinacy): for instance, given that Aristotle 
does not necessarily exist, ‘The pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great’ and its 
rigidified version ‘The actual pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great’ do not 
satisfy (Obstinacy). The former is not rigid at all, and while the latter satisfies (Kripke 
Rigidity), it does not satisfy (Obstinacy). This is because ‘The actual pupil of Plato and 
teacher of Alexander the Great’ does not refer to anything in possible worlds in which 
Aristotle does not exist: if nothing in those worlds satisfies the predicate ‘x is the actual pupil 
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 Kaplan initially thought that direct reference underpinned Kripke’s notion of rigidity because he thought that 
Kripke meant by it what he means by ‘obstinate rigidity’ (see Kaplan, 1989b: 569-71). Not so. In a letter that 
Kaplan partly reproduces (n. 8), Kripke gives the following definition of rigid designation: ‘a designator d of an 
object x is rigid, if it designates x with respect to all possible worlds where x exists, and never designates an 
object other than x with respect to any possible world’ (Kripke’s italics). Like what I have called ‘Kripke 
Rigidity’ in section 1, this definition does not require it to be settled in advance of evaluation what a designator 
refers to at worlds at which there is no candidate to be the name’s referent. However, unlike with (Kripke 
Rigidity), an interpretation of this definition in terms of obstinacy is not ruled out. 
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of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great’, the definite description is empty.
9
 However, 
descriptions that are strongly rigid designators, such as ‘The smallest prime’, are obstinate: 
there will not be worlds in which nothing satisfies the description ‘x is the smallest prime’. 
 
In Kaplan’s framework there is an organic connection between (Dubbing), (Direct 
Reference), and (Obstinacy) for proper names: (Dubbing) entails (Direct Reference), which 
entails (Obstinacy). But although (Dubbing) and (Direct Reference) are distinctive of proper 
names, as opposed to definite descriptions, (Obstinacy) is not, because of the modal status of 
the referents of strongly rigid definite descriptions. So if we want a notion of obstinacy that 
is distinctive of proper names, and does not apply to these descriptions, (Obstinacy) is not 
yet adequate. In the next section, I will consider natural kind terms again, fine tune 
(Obstinacy) and offer a version of it that applies to proper names and natural kind terms, and 
not to descriptive singular or general terms. 
 
 
3. Obstinacy De Jure and Obstinacy De Facto  
 
If, like proper names, natural kind terms are directly referential, they are also obstinately 
rigid. I am going to assume here that both proper names and natural kind terms are directly 
referential. In section 4, I will discuss this question in greater detail. 
 
Now, recall that our original problem was that (Kripke Rigidity) trivialises when stable 
referents (such as sui generis kinds, intentions, properties or universals) for natural kind 
terms are considered. Here, the same sort of problem arises with the notion of rigidity at 
issue in (Obstinacy). More precisely, the problem comes from the fact that the best 
candidates to be the stable referents of general terms seem to be necessary existents – that is, 
things that exist in all possible worlds. So (Obstinacy) also trivialises for general terms 
because of the modal status of the sorts of entities which they refer to: general terms all refer 
to the same things in all possible worlds. In Kripke’s terminology, general terms are all 
strongly rigid. 
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 Here, I assume that the domain of the variable with respect to a possible world is restricted to the individuals 




So (Obstinacy) is not a sort of rigidity that applies to natural kind terms but not to 
descriptive general terms. This problem with obstinacy is related to that just raised 
concerning singular terms, where not only proper names but also strongly rigid definite 
descriptions were obstinately rigid because the latter refer to necessary existents. So both in 
the case of singular and general terms, the reason why (Obstinacy) is not distinctive of 
proper names and natural kind terms is that many descriptions satisfy (Obstinacy) because 
they refer to necessary existents. Although the root of the problem is the same, the problem 
is more dramatic in the case of general terms because arguably, all descriptive general terms 
refer to necessary existents and so (Obstinacy) trivialises in this case. 
 
There are several ways in which this problem can be addressed. I will not consider in detail 
here ways that consist in requiring that the referents of general terms do not necessarily exist. 
For instance, it could be argued that natural kinds only exist in some possible worlds, namely 
worlds in which they apply to samples – e.g. worlds in which there are no parcels of water 
are worlds in which the kind water does not exist. One possible way to construe kinds so 
understood would be as immanent universals, perhaps in the fashion of Aristotelian moderate 
realism. On such sorts of proposals, natural kind terms would be obstinately rigid because 
they are directly referential, and descriptive general terms would not be obstinately rigid 
because they are not directly referential – many of them would merely satisfy (Kripke 
Rigidity). In particular, the natural kind term ‘water’ would be obstinately rigid because it is 
directly referential; but the descriptive general term ‘transparent liquid of which lakes are 
composed and which falls as rain’ would not even be rigid: it would not refer to anything in 
worlds in which no property satisfies its descriptive content, and it would refer to a different 
property in worlds in which another property satisfies its descriptive content. For this to be 
an attractive proposal that works both for general and singular terms, it would also have to 
hold of the strongly rigid definite descriptions mentioned previously, such as ‘The smallest 
prime’; that is to say, it would also need to be the case that numbers do not necessarily exist. 
 
I do not think that this proposal is worth pursuing. From a semantic standpoint it is not very 
appealing: it requires us to make substantive assumptions about metaphysical matters, e.g. 
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the metaphysics of kinds or properties or numbers. And it would be more satisfactory to be 
able to distinguish between the rigidity of natural kind terms and that of descriptive general 
terms not only on metaphysical, but also on semantic grounds. 
 
Rather, I suggest that we look for a construal of (Obstinacy) that avoids trivialisation by 
appealing to Kripke’s distinction between de jure and de facto rigid designation, which he 
applies to his own characterisation of rigidity, (Kripke Rigidity). According to Kripke, a 
designator is rigid de jure if it is rigid as a matter of stipulation and it is rigid de facto if it 
happens to be rigid. As he puts it, the distinction is between: 
 
‘de jure’ rigidity, where the reference of a designator is stipulated to be a single 
object ... and mere ‘de facto’ rigidity, where a description ‘the x such that Fx’ 
happens to use a predicate ‘F’ that in each possible world is true of one and the 
same unique object. (Kripke, 1980: 21 n.21) 
 
For instance, the description ‘The smallest prime’ satisfies (Kripke Rigidity) de facto 
because it merely happens to use the predicate ‘is a smallest prime’, which in each possible 
world is true of the number two. By contrast, although the description ‘The number Alice is 
thinking about now’ happens to refer to the number two, it is not de facto rigid because there 
are worlds in which ‘is a number which Alice is thinking about now’ refers to another 
number. Indeed that latter description does not even satisfy (Kripke Rigidity). The way 
Kripke states it, de facto rigidity only holds of strongly rigid designators – rigid designators 
of necessary existents – because it demands that the predicate in the description is true of one 
and the same unique object in each possible world. However it is natural to think that 
descriptions that satisfy (Kripke Rigidity) but are not strongly rigid could still be rigid de 
facto. Intuitively ‘The actual pupil of Plato’ satisfies (Kripke Rigidity) de facto, although it is 
not strongly rigid: it happens to use a predicate ‘is an actual teacher of Plato’ that is true of 
one and the same unique object in every possible world in which that object exists. That is, 





I will assume here that we can apply de facto rigidity to descriptions that are rigid but not 
strongly rigid. However, note that for my purposes nothing turns on this because the 
descriptions that are troublesome for (Obstinacy) as the distinctive notion of rigidity for 
proper names and natural kind terms are all de facto strongly rigid. More precisely, only 
definite descriptions and descriptive general terms that satisfy (Kripke Rigidity) de facto and 
are strongly rigid satisfy (Obstinacy). Definite descriptions and descriptive general terms that 
satisfy (Kripke Rigidity) de facto but are not strongly rigid designators do not satisfy 
(Obstinacy).  
 
Thus, two things conspire in making (Obstinacy) not distinctive of proper names and natural 
kind terms: the fact that certain descriptions use certain predicates, which given their 
meanings happen to apply to the same thing in all possible worlds, and the metaphysical 
status of the things referred to by the descriptions that contain those predicates.  
 
Let us now apply the de jure-de facto distinction to (Obstinacy), which is the construal of 
rigidity required by (Direct Reference) and so intuitively applies to proper names and natural 
kind terms. We get the following contrast between two ways of being obstinately rigid: 
 
(De Jure Obstinacy) A de jure obstinately rigid designator is a designator that 
designates the same object in all possible worlds as a matter of stipulation. 
 
(De Facto Obstinacy) A de facto obstinately rigid designator is a designator that 
designates the same object in all possible worlds, but not as a matter of stipulation. 
 
My suggestion is now that (De Jure Obstinacy) is the distinctive notion of rigidity we are 
looking for: both proper names and natural kind terms kind terms satisfy (De Jure 
Obstinacy), and neither definite descriptions nor descriptive general terms do – although they 
may satisfy (De Facto Obstinacy). In particular (De Jure Obstinacy) does not trivialise when 
general terms are considered. Also, whether a designator satisfies (De Jure Obstinacy) has 
nothing to do with the metaphysical status of its referent, i.e. with whether it refers to a 




To make this suggestion precise, the notion of a stipulation needs to be made precise, which 
turns out to be no straightforward matter. 
 
The contrast between de jure and de facto rigidity is formulated in terms of stipulation and 
lack of stipulation as to whether a term is rigid. As it is, this is unsatisfactory because there is 
a sense in which whether an expression is rigid is always a matter of stipulation – or at least, 
there is always a sense in which a stipulation comes into play. And this is the case whether or 
not that expression is directly referential. Thus consider for instance the case of rigidified 
descriptions such as ‘the actual pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great’. There is a 
clear sense in which such descriptions are rigid as a matter of stipulation – because the 
adjective ‘actual’ is defined so as to always refer to the actual world. So there is a sense in 
which it does not seem to be the case that such descriptions are rigid because they contain 
predicates (e.g. ‘is an actual pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander) that happen (i.e. is not 
stipulated) to apply to the same objects in every possible world in which those objects exist. 
Such descriptions have been rigidified, i.e. stipulated to be rigid.  
 
Now, again, descriptions such as ‘the actual pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the 
Great’ do not immediately concern us here because they satisfy (Kripke Rigidity) but not 
(Obstinacy). However, consider again Kripke’s example of a de facto strongly rigid 
designator, such as the description ‘the smallest prime’, or better the rigidified description 
‘the actual smallest prime’. It is not clear that these descriptions do not satisfy (De Jure 
Obstinacy). So the distinction between de jure and de facto demands further analysis. 
 
One possible articulation of the distinction between de jure and de facto obstinate rigidity 
goes by appealing to the notion of contingency, which is invited by that of a description 
happening to use a predicate that is true of one and the same unique object in each possible 
world. On this proposal, the contrast would be between expressions that are contingently 
rigid (de facto) and expressions that are not contingently rigid (de jure) – where the former 
are expressions that, in some sense, could have failed to be rigid. On this proposal, ‘the 
smallest prime’ would be a description that could have failed to be obstinately rigid because 
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the predicate ‘x is a smallest prime’ could have failed to be true of the same unique object in 
each possible world.  
 
There are two ways of making this proposal. The first would yield that ‘the smallest prime’ is 
contingently obstinately rigid because it could have failed to refer to a necessary existent, 
namely the number two. But this cannot be made sense of: it is false to say that the ‘the 
smallest prime’ could have failed to refer to the number two, in particular it is false to say 
that ‘x is a smallest prime’ could have failed to apply to the number two. Given this 
description’s (and predicate’s) meaning, it just does not seem that it could have failed to refer 
to that number. For it to do so, it would have needed to have another meaning than it actually 
has. Here it would not help to individuate expressions syntactically, and say that rigidity is a 
property of syntactic type, rather than semantically in terms of their meanings: ‘the smallest 
prime’ would indeed only be contingently rigid, but then all rigid expressions would only be 
contingently rigid. In particular all expressions that we hoped would be rigid de jure, such as 
proper names and natural kind terms, would be contingently rigid – i.e. de facto rigid. 
 
The second way has it that ‘the smallest prime’ is contingently obstinately rigid because the 
number two might not have existed necessarily. On this proposal, the description ‘the 
smallest prime’ would be contingently rigid because if the number two had not been a 
necessary existent, the description would not have been rigid. The problem here is again that 
this option forces us to make decisions about the metaphysical status of the number two. 
Also, more generally, it requires us to deny that what is necessary is necessarily necessary, 
i.e. to reject S4, something that perhaps we should not do (at least not for this reason). 
 
So we cannot articulate the contrast between de jure and de dicto obstinacy in terms of 
whether it is contingent that an expression satisfies (Obstinacy). 
 
Consider yet another way of articulating the distinction between de jure and de facto rigid 





 However, the suggestion of assimilating de jure rigidity to 
nondescriptive designation and de facto rigidity to descriptive designation is unsatisfactory; 
for although it might in fact be true that all expressions that are de jure rigid are 
nondescriptive and that all expressions that are de facto rigid are descriptive, nevertheless 
these two distinctions – de jure-de facto rigidity and nondescriptive-descriptive designation – 
are intuitively different. The former concerns the way an expression is made to refer to its 
referent and the latter concerns whether an expression is semantically complex. If these are 
distinct semantic distinctions (although perhaps coextensive), we need to find something else 
to explain the distinction between de jure and de facto rigidity, as well as the fact that it 
might coincide with that between nondescriptive and descriptive designation. It is true that, 
given the way de facto rigidity is defined by Kripke, only descriptive expressions are de 
facto obstinate, for whether an expression is de facto obstinate is a matter of it using a 
predicate that happens to apply to the same thing in all possible worlds. If an expression uses 
a predicate, it is descriptive. However, the way the distinction between de jure and de facto is 
stated, does not preclude there being descriptions that are de jure obstinate. So we still need 
an explanation of why all de jure obstinate expressions might be nondescriptive. 
 
I now want to argue that the contrast between de jure and de facto obstinate rigid designation 
should be explained in terms of the metasemantics of direct reference. I think that it is 
natural to turn to direct reference for an explanation of the distinction between de jure and de 
facto rigidity: direct reference semantically entails obstinate rigid designation, and it is 
natural to think that this entailment holds as a matter of stipulation. Now, as we have seen, 
(Direct Reference) applies to proper names because they are introduced at dubbings. I 
suggest that it is (Dubbing) that is the relevant metasemantic explanation for why an 
expression has the semantic property of direct reference. Also, the notion of a stipulation is 
intuitively a metasemantic notion, which concerns our intention/decision to assign a given 
semantic property to an expression. So it is appropriate to turn to dubbing as the relevant 
metasemantic notion to explain de jure obstinacy. Again, a dubbing is the semantic 
individuation of an expression by assigning it a referent. And so an expression introduced as 
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 Salmon (2005: 35) takes the distinction in this way. And in many ways it is a natural way to take what 
Kripke says about it (see again his 1980: 21, n.21). See also Stanley 1997: 537. 
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a dubbing is directly referential: it only contributes its referent to the propositions expressed 
by the sentences in which it occurs. And that means that that expression is obstinately rigid – 
more precisely, it is de jure obstinately rigid because it is the very way in which it has been 
individuated that makes it obstinately rigid.  
 
This metasemantic explanation in terms of dubbing also gives us a good contrast between 
expressions that satisfy (De Jure Obstinacy) and those that merely satisfy (De Facto 
Obstinacy). As I said, I take it that proper names and natural kind terms satisfy the former 
and definite descriptions and descriptive general terms do not. Definite descriptions and 
descriptive general terms are not introduced at dubbings: they are not individuated by 
assigning them referents. So they are not stipulated to be obstinate. Such expressions will 
merely be de facto obstinately rigid designators, if they refer to things that exist in all 
possible worlds. Further, the metasemantic explanation of (De Jure Obstinacy) in terms of 
dubbing also explains why expressions that are de jure obstinate are not descriptive: for 
descriptive expressions are not individuated by assigning them a referent. So de jure 
obstinacy and nondescriptivity indeed coincide, but the explanation for this is given from 
above – in terms of the fact that they are semantic consequences of the same metasemantic 
story. 
 
So the final proposal concerning rigidity for proper names and natural kind terms is this: it is 
(De Jure Obstinacy) that is the distinctive, non-trivial, notion of rigidity. Natural kind terms 
and proper names are de jure obstinately rigid, definite descriptions and descriptive general 
terms are not. To satisfy (De Jure Obstinacy) such terms have to satisfy (Direct Reference) 
and (Dubbing), because the stipulation alluded to in (De Jure Obstinacy) is the dubbing. 
Ultimately it is the metasemantics of direct reference that enables us to single out proper 
names and natural kind terms as de jure obstinately rigid designators. In the next section, I 
will say more about how the metasemantic notion of dubbing should be taken to work. 
 
In this debate concerning whether rigidity trivialises when general terms are considered, it is 
generally assumed that in order to draw a contrast between two sorts of expressions in terms 
of (some construal of) rigidity that carves at the semantic joints, we ought to say that one 
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sort is rigid and that the other is not at all rigid. The current proposal makes no such 
assumption. And given the plethora of notions of rigidity that are available, there is no 
reason to expect that such an assumption should hold. According to my proposal we carve at 
the semantic joints by distinguishing between different types of rigidity. Both proper names 
and natural kind terms are distinctive in satisfying (De Jure Obstinacy), descriptive 
expressions that refer to necessary existents satisfy (De Facto Obstinacy), and remaining 
rigidified descriptions satisfy (Kripke Rigidity). And so it may be the case that rigidity is like 
a club which is not very interesting because too many get automatic membership. However, 






4. Dubbing and Natural Kind Terms  
 
I have claimed that the distinctive notion of rigidity for proper names and natural kind terms 
is that of de jure obstinate rigidity. And I have argued that for them to be rigid in this way, 
they would have to be introduced at dubbings. In this last section I briefly address some 
possible worries concerning the idea that natural kind terms might be introduced at 
dubbings. Here I assume that the claim that proper names are introduced at dubbings to be 
comparatively unproblematic, and so I do not offer a defence of the claim that they are. I 
merely argue that saying that natural kind terms are introduced at dubbings is no more 
problematic than saying that proper names are introduced at dubbings. A full defence that 
proper names and natural kind terms are introduced at dubbings would require a separate 
paper. 
 
As I said before, for Kaplan a dubbing is the semantic individuation of a term by assigning it 
a referent. One key condition on the successful introduction of a term at a dubbing is that 
there is a unique referent for that term. The other is that the dubber intends to introduce a 
new term rather than to follow an already established use of a term (see Kaplan 1989a: 560). 
I label these two conditions ‘(Creativity)’ and ‘(Unicity)’: 
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(Creativity) The dubber has creative linguistic intentions.  
 
(Unicity) There is a unique referent to the term introduced. 
 
(Unicity) entails that a term that does not uniquely refer is not the result of a successful 
dubbing. In particular, empty terms are not the result of successful dubbings: for instance, 
terms that – perhaps unbeknownst to the would-be dubber – turn out to be empty at the 
dubbing or terms that are introduced in fictional contexts.
12
 That means that (Unicity) can 
trump (Creativity). The creative linguistic intentions of the dubber are defeasible: she may 
be wrong – if there is no unique candidate to be the referent, she may intend to introduce a 
term and fail to do so. Saying that creative linguistic intentions are defeasible implies that 
those intentions do not carry a huge amount of semantic weight. As a corollary, that implies 
that it is not always transparent to a speaker which semantic properties an expression has, in 
particular whether that expression is directly referential or is a rigid designator (and what 
sort). This might be hidden from view at the time of the dubbing. 
 
These conditions on dubbing give us a good prima facie contrast between proper names and 
definite descriptions. For one thing, (Creativity) has no clear application to the latter, 
because definite descriptions are typically made up of expressions that are already in the 
language. So there is no real introduction or creation of such a description, but rather the 
putting together of expressions that have already been assigned a meaning. Moreover, 
(Unicity) is not a condition on the use of a definite description, whose meaning is not tied to 
there being a unique referent: definite descriptions can be empty or pick out several objects. 
 
The question now is whether these conditions on dubbing give us a good contrast between 
natural kind terms and general descriptive terms. I consider three objections to the idea that 
natural kind terms are introduced at dubbings, and argue that they are not successful. 
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 Kaplan wants to rule out expressions that are introduced in fictional, imaginary, hallucinatory, or otherwise 
defective contexts as contexts in which an individual is dubbed. In his 1968: 383 he also excludes as successful 
dubbings of merely possible objects such as if we dubbed ‘Newman 1’ the first child born in the 22nd Century. 
(However this is counted as a successful dubbing in his 1973: n. 7.) This sort of case raises the question of the 
extent to which the dubber has to be acquainted (whether demonstratively or descriptively) with the dubbee in 




Firstly, it could be argued that natural kind terms are typically not introduced at dubbings for 
the reason that a dubbing is a simple unique act of baptism, and natural kind terms are 
generally not introduced in the language by some single such act. They typically emerge in 
the language as the result of a more gradual process, not as the result of a single intentional 
act but of many.  
 
That seems right. However, note that the same holds of many names – many names are 
gradually introduced in the language. For instance, we can think of the gradual process by 
which a nickname sticks (Evans’ example in his 1973). So it is not clear that we have a 
significant difference here between proper names and natural kind terms. In both cases talk 
of ‘dubbing’, if it suggests a single act of baptism, is a convenient fiction, and it would 
ultimately have to be understood in a way that allows for directly referential expressions to 




One helpful way to understand the notion of a dubbing is as follows: saying that a term has 
been introduced at a dubbing need not be making an actual historical claim about its actual 
mode of introduction. In particular, it need not be making the claim that there was actually a 
single act of baptism during which that term was introduced. For many terms, we just do not 
know the precise context or mode of their introduction into the language, and probably such 
an introduction was somewhat messy. For such terms, the idea of them being introduced at 
dubbings could rather be taken as follows: given their basic semantic properties (e.g. direct 
reference, de jure obstinacy), these terms are such that they could have been introduced at a 
single act of baptism, i.e. at a dubbing. For instance, given the basic semantic properties of 
‘tiger’, this natural kind term could have been introduced at a single act of baptism. In 
particular, ‘tiger’ could have been introduced by just pointing at a tiger and ostensively 
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 Many philosophers talk of reference-fixing or ostensive definitions in connection with natural kind terms – 
these too suggest a single act of baptism, and these too are convenient fictions. Note in passing that dubbing 
and reference-fixing are different. Unlike dubbing, reference-fixing need not be understood as the semantic 
individuation of a term, but merely as the fixation of the referent of that term. So the latter is in principle 
compatible with the idea that we have a meaningful natural kind term in advance of assigning it a referent, and 
in principle it allows for there to be meaningful empty natural kind terms (terms that are natural kind terms and 
that are empty) – it thus does not entail direct reference or obstinate rigidity. 
22 
 
define the term ‘tiger’ by saying ‘Here is a tiger’ or ‘A tiger is anything like this’. If a term 
could intuitively have been introduced in this way, we have a good explanation of why it is 
not descriptive, but directly referential. So dubbing so-understood gives us a good 
explanation of why certain terms have the basic semantic properties that the do. It gives us a 
good theoretical reconstruction or metasemantic explanation of what semantically distinctive 
about certain terms, such as natural kind terms. 
 
Secondly, one might argue that natural kind terms are not introduced at dubbings because 
although we can use proper names to arbitrarily name anything at will, we cannot do this 
with natural kind terms. Intuitively, the latter cannot just be created at will, they have to refer 
to natural kinds, and not just anything is a natural kind: stipulations of referents for proper 
names come cheap, but not so for natural kind terms.  
 
However, note first that Kaplan’s account of proper names is in any case inhospitable to the 
idea that we can create proper names at will: (Unicity) would require that there is a unique 
object that is dubbed using a proper name, and so creative intentions are defeasible in the 
case of proper names. What is true, though, is that the class of thing that can be successfully 
dubbed with a name is bigger than the class of things that can be successfully dubbed with a 
natural kind term – natural kinds are harder to come by and so natural kind terms are harder 
to come by. But that does not seem to be a semantically significant fact. For instance Danish 
proper names are harder to come by than English proper names, but that does not point to 
any significant semantic difference between them. 
 
Thirdly, a related objection could be that it is somehow more difficult to introduce natural 
kind terms than it is to introduce proper name because the former refer to complex things, 
things with a complex (molecular, biological, or what have you) structure, while the latter do 
not. One way of making this objection is by saying that the intentions involved in 
introducing a natural kind terms are more complex than those involved in introducing a 




But this is rather contentious. Consider for instance the natural kind term ‘water’. Putnam 
(1975) has convincingly argued that ‘water’ did refer to the kind water at the time at which it 
was introduced in the language, although that time was well before people had any 
knowledge of chemistry, or even any idea of the sort of complexity that natural kind might 
involve. So it does not seem that in the case of natural kind terms the intentions of the 
dubber(s) ought to be more complex than in the case of proper names. 
 
Another way of making this objection from complexity is to say that dubbing a natural kind 
is more complex not because the intentions of the dubber(s) have to be more complex but 
merely because the things dubbed are more complex. Their complexity is such that, 
typically, it is empirical, scientific, investigation that reveals whether the dubbing has been 
successful – whether a unique genuine natural kind has been referred to.  
 
However, and this is relevant to the previous paragraph, we can of course dub complex 
things using proper names. In particular, we can dub natural kinds using proper names, 
where perhaps only empirical investigation could tell whether the dubbing is successful. And 
we might also want to dub objects with a complex structure using proper names. For 
instance we might want to dub with the name ‘Alice’ (say) something which we think is a 
fertilised egg (i.e. a human animal); but we might fail to do so because there is no fertilised 
egg to be dubbed but only a bunch of cells that do not (yet) form a single organism. Only 
empirical investigation will reveal that the introduction of the name ‘Alice’ was 
unsuccessful. 
 
So there does not seem to be significant differences between proper names and natural kind 
terms with respect to the way (Dubbing) applies to them. If so, the claim that natural kind 
terms, just like proper names, are introduced at dubbings is plausible.  
 
The notion of dubbing as explained here also further enables us to draw a satisfactory 
contrast between natural kind terms and descriptive general terms. Like definite descriptions, 
descriptive general terms are typically made up of expressions already present in the 
language, so they are not as such introduced in the language. So (Creativity) typically does 
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not apply. But also (Unicity) is not a condition on the use of descriptive general terms: 
descriptive general terms can be empty or pick out several kinds, or things. A successful use 
of a descriptive general term such as ‘transparent liquid of which lakes are composed and 
which falls as rain’ does not require the existence of a unique kind. 
 
Given the connection between (Dubbing), (Direct Reference) and (De Jure Obstinacy), if it 
can plausibly said that natural kind terms indeed satisfy (Dubbing) and descriptive general 
terms do not, that means that the former satisfy (De Jure Obstinacy) and the latter do not. 
And so, again, we have got hold of a notion of rigidity that carves at the semantic joints. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I have argued that proper names and natural kind terms are distinctive in being 
de jure obstinately rigid designators. What explains that they have this semantic property is 
that they are directly referential terms introduced at dubbings. Dubbing is the metasemantic 
parameter that ultimately explains the distinctive status of proper names and natural kind 
terms as de jure obstinately rigid designators. Some descriptive general terms and definite 
descriptions are rigid (in some sense or other of rigidity), but given that they are not 
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The picture of rigidity that we get if we adopt the considerations put forward in this 
paper are summarised in the table below. Note that many of the expressions that appear 
in the squares are just standard examples for illustration. For instance, I have taken 
‘water’ to refer to a necessary existent and put it in square labelled ‘I’ (de jure strongly 
obstinately rigid designator), but some might rather put it in the square labelled ‘III’ (de 
jure non-strongly obstinately rigid designator). Also, not all the expressions that figure 
in this table have been discussed in the paper (e.g. demonstratives and indexicals) but I 
included them for completeness. The aim here is just to give a general idea of how a 
classification of different types of rigid designators might work. 
 
 
 Obstinately rigid designator Nononstinately rigid designator 
De jure + strongly 
(originates at a dubbing 









                                                    II 
De jure + non-strongly 
(originates at a dubbing 











                                                   IV 
De facto + strongly 
(does not originate at a 
dubbing + refers to a 
necessary existent) 
‘The smallest prime’ 
‘The actual smallest prime’ 
‘Transparent liquid of which 
lakes are composed, and 
which falls as rain’ 
‘H2O 







                                                   VI 
De facto + non-
strongly 
(does not originate at a 
dubbing + does not 
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‘The actual pupil of Plato and 
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